Archive for the ‘Report’ Category


Calcutta, Dhaka, Jakarta and Manila rated ‘extreme risk’ in study of climate change vulnerability

26/10/2011

Maplecroft’s Climate Change and Environment Risk Atlas 2012
The fourth release of Maplecroft’s Climate Change and Environment Risk Atlas includes a new Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI) that analyses and maps climate change vulnerability down to 25km² worldwide. It reveals that some of the world’s fastest growing populations are increasingly at risk from the impacts of climate related natural hazards including sea level rise.

Many of the countries with the fastest population growth are rated as ‘extreme risk’ in the CCVI, including the strategically important emerging economies of Bangladesh (2nd), the Philippines (10th), Viet Nam (23th), Indonesia (27th) and India (28th).

Climate change and population growth form the two greatest challenges facing the world over the next century. This issue of population growth is driven home by this week’s announcement by the UN’s State of the World’s Population Report 2011 revealing that the world’s population has now reached 7 billion people.

The Climate Change Vulnerability Index features subnational maps and analysis of climate change vulnerability and the adaptive capacity to combat climate change in 193 countries. It features an improved methodology analysing the exposure of populations to climate related natural hazards and sensitivity of countries in terms of population concentration, development, natural resources, agricultural dependency and conflict.

At a national level, the CCVI rates 30 countries at ‘extreme risk,’ with the top 10 comprising of Haiti, Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Cambodia, Mozambique, DR Congo, Malawi and Philippines. Of these Bangladesh and the Philippines are among the world’s fastest growing economies with growth rates of 6.6 and 5% per annum, respectively.

Subnational analysis reveals vulnerability of fastest growing cities

The value of Maplecroft’s research is much better appreciated at a subnational level, where risks to towns, cities, economic zones and individual company assets can be identified through interactive maps, which chart vulnerability, exposure and sensitivity to climate change down to 25km² worldwide. For instance, extreme hotpots of vulnerability can be seen in the South West of Brazil and coastal regions of China, but both countries are rated ‘medium risk’ by the CCVI at the national level.

Vulnerability on this scale is illustrated particularly well when looking at the effects of climate change on the megacities of Asia; some of which have the highest rates of population growth, along with extreme vulnerability to climate change.

Of the world’s 20 fastest growing cities, six have been classified as ‘extreme risk’ by the CCVI, including the major Asian economic centres of Calcutta in India, Manila in the Philippines, Jakarta in Indonesia and Dhaka and Chittagong in Bangladesh. Addis Ababa in Ethiopia also features. A further 10 are rated as ‘high risk’ including Guangdong, Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai, Karachi and Lagos.

Population growth in cities combined with socio-economic factors increase climate risks

According to Maplecroft, population growth in these cities combines with poor government effectiveness, corruption, poverty and other socio-economic factors to increase the risks to residents and business. Infrastructures, which cannot cope at 2011 levels, will therefore struggle to adapt to large population rises in the future, making disaster responses less effective, whilst at the same time these disasters themselves may become more frequent. This has implications for buildings, transportation routes, water and energy supply and the health of the residents.

“Cities such as Manila, Jakarta and Calcutta are vital centres of economic growth in key emerging markets, but heat waves, flooding, water shortages and increasingly severe and frequent storm events may well increase as climate changes takes hold” states Principal Environmental Analyst at Maplecroft Dr Charlie Beldon. “The impacts of this could have far reaching consequences, not only for local populations, but on business, national economies and on the balance sheets of investors around the world, particularly as the economic importance of these nations is set to dramatically increase.”

Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2012

Legend
Extreme risk
High risk
Medium risk
Low risk
No Data
Rank Country Rating
1 Haiti Extreme
2 Bangladesh Extreme
3 Zimbabwe Extreme
4 Sierra Leone Extreme
5 Madagascar Extreme
Rank Country Rating
6 Cambodia Extreme
7 Mozambique Extreme
8 DR Congo Extreme
9 Malawi Extreme
10 Philippines Extreme

Manila most exposed to flooding and typhoons

Manila, the commercial centre of the Philippines, is extremely vulnerable to the effects of climate change due to a combination of exposure to hazards, poor socio-economic factors and a low capacity to adapt. The city is predicted to grow by 2.23 million residents between 2010 and 2020 an increase of nearly 20%. It is particularly at risk of flooding and typhoon activity, having the highest exposure to these events out of the twenty growth cities. In July 2010 Typhoon Conson hit near to Manila killing 146 and affecting over half a million people. Events such as this could well increase in frequency and severity, which should make improvements to the adaptive capacity of the city a priority for the national government of the Philippines.

Poorest sections of society bear brunt of exposure to climate related hazards

“The expansion of population must be met with an equal expansion of infrastructure and civic amenities. As these megacities grow, more people are forced to live on exposed land, often on flood plains or other marginal land, adds Dr Beldon. “It is therefore the poorest citizens that will be most exposed to the effects of climate change, and the least able to cope with the effects.”

This is witnessed by the large slum populations, which are present in many of the rapidly growing cities and where residents frequently have fragile livelihoods and poor access to basic resources, such as clean water. In Calcutta, which is predicted to increase by 3.1 million people to18.7 million by 2020, approximately one third of the current population live in slums. Calcutta is highly exposed to sea level rise and coastal flooding and the predicted population growth will place more people within these vulnerable areas.

Thailand flooding illustrated the risks to business

Thailand, another rapidly growing economy is presently bearing the brunt of climate related disasters. Since July over 350 people have died in the floods. The credit rating agency Moody’s estimated that the floods would cost Thailand more than $6.5 billion. The Central Government has cut economic growth forecasts accordingly. The concentration of technical firms in flood affected areas could well result in wider disruptions to global supply chains; Thailand is the world’s largest producer of hard-disk drives. In the face of climate change businesses with global supply chains and investors would do well to learn from Thailand’s recent  flood experience.
………
Maplecroft

Advertisements

Following recent military-rigged elections in Burma, the pace of foreign investments, particularly in the natural resource sector, is increasing. Burma’s military government is allowing China to build pipelines across the country which will drain Burma of its massive natural gas reserves, dashing hopes of economic development. Building the pipelines and extracting the gas are fuelling further conflicts and abuses: battles between armed groups and the government have broken out near the pipeline route and land confiscation and forced labor has started in project areas. Despite great risks, communities are standing up and voicing their concerns and opposition.

Download English language version of Sold Out

Download English language press release

World Report 2011: Burma

Posted: March 2, 2011 in Report

Events of 2010
 

Burma’s human rights situation remained dire in 2010, even after the country’s first multiparty elections in 20 years. The ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) continued to systematically deny all basic freedoms to citizens and sharply constrained political participation. The rights of freedom of expression, association, assembly, and media remained severely curtailed. The government took no significant steps during the year to release more than 2,100 political prisoners being held, except for the November 13 release of Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi.

Calls mounted for an international commission of inquiry into serious violations of international law perpetrated by all parties to Burma’s ongoing civil conflict. The Burmese military was responsible for ongoing abuses against civilians in conflict areas, including widespread forced labor, extrajudicial killings, and forced expulsion of the population. Non-state armed ethnic groups have also been implicated in serious abuses such as recruitment of child soldiers, execution of Burmese prisoners of war, and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines around civilian areas.
The November 2010 Elections

In November Burma held long-planned elections. These took place in an atmosphere of intimidation, coercion, and widespread corruption, with laws and regulations strongly favoring military controlled parties.

In March the SPDC formed the Union Electoral Commission (UEC) and released a series of laws governing the conduct of the elections, which included provisions barring any person serving a prison sentence from party membership. This effectively forced the National League for Democracy (NLD) to decide whether to dismiss Aung San Suu Kyi-who was under house arrest-and more than 430 of its jailed members, in order to re-register with the UEC. The NLD ultimately did not re-register, and the UEC declared it illegal.

Other provisions tightly regulated the campaigning of parties and candidates, warned against public disturbances, and expressly outlawed public criticism of the constitution and the military. The government declared illegal a boycott campaign that some NLD members organized, and warned the public that election boycotters could face one year in prison.

In April Prime Minister Lt. Gen. Thein Sein and 27 SPDC and government cabinet ministers resigned their military commissions and formed the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). In August the USDP absorbed all the assets and infrastructure of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a mass-based social welfare movement formed by the military in 1993 with more than 26 million nominal members. The military conducted its biggest reshuffle in years, with scores of senior officers resigning in order to run as USDP candidates.

The USDP was the only party that fielded candidates for virtually all 1,168 seats open for contest in the national bicameral assembly and 14 regional assemblies. The remaining seats, out of a total of 1,551, are reserved for serving military officers as stipulated in the 2008 constitution.

By November 37 parties had registered and were contesting the elections. Many were small, ethnic-based parties only contesting a limited number of regional seats. Voting was not conducted in parts of 32 townships in ethnic border areas where the government alleged there was armed conflict and instability. Widespread irregularities, such as advance bulk voting by local officials, were reported in some regional areas.

The USDP won more than 80 percent of the seats in the bicameral national parliament. Results were mixed in the 14 state and regional assemblies, with some ethnic parties gaining half the number of seats, particularly in Arakan and Shan states. Burman-dominated regions had majority USDP candidates elected. Many opposition parties lodged official complaints with the electoral commission citing widespread corruption, particularly by USDP members and officials.
Ethnic Conflict, Displacement, and Refugees

The Burmese military continues to direct attacks on civilians in ethnic areas, particularly in Karen, Karenni, and Shan states of eastern Burma, and parts of western Burma in China and Arakan states. Tensions increased with ethnic armed groups that had agreed to ceasefires with the government, such as the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), over the government’s plans to transform these militias into Border Guard Force units under direct Burmese army control. By the end of 2010 only five militias had agreed, leaving large groups such as the Kachin, Wa, and Mon facing increased military pressure to transform, partly demobilize, and surrender territory. As a result of increased tensions, parts of 32 townships in Burma- including most of the Wa area on China’s border-did not conduct polls in November. There are widespread fears of resumed conflict in 2011 in ethnic areas that have experienced uneasy peace for the past two decades.

Abuses by the Burmese military against civilians in violation of international humanitarian law include the widespread use of anti-personnel landmines, sexual violence against women and girls, extrajudicial killings, forced labor, torture, beatings, targeting of food production and means of civilian livelihood, and confiscation of land and property. All parties to Burma’s conflicts continue to actively recruit and use child soldiers, with the Tatmadaw (state military) continuing to use them even as the SPDC cooperates with the International Labour Organization (ILO) on demobilizing child soldiers.

Approximately half-a-million people are internally displaced due to conflict in eastern Burma, with more than 140,000 refugees in camps in Thailand. In Bangladesh, there are 28,000 Rohingya refugees in official camps, and another 200,000 live in makeshift settlements or mixed in with the local population around border areas. Millions of Burmese migrant workers, refugees, and asylum seekers live in Thailand, India, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Singapore.
Humanitarian Assistance

Burma’s humanitarian situation did not markedly improve in 2010 despite attempts by international relief agencies and Burmese civil society to expand operating space and programs in the country.

The Tripartite Core Group (TCG), a multilateral mechanism formed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the SPDC, and the United Nations in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, concluded its operations in July. The UN continued to slowly expand its humanitarian initiative in Northern Arakan State to assist Rohingya, who have been denied citizenship and suffered abuses by state and paramilitary forces for decades, including restrictions on movement, livelihoods, and freedom of religion. Abuses against Rohingya women, including restrictions on the right to marry and access maternal health, are particularly grave. Humanitarian space throughout Burma constricted markedly ahead of the November elections, with international humanitarian organizations being denied work visas for staff, travel permits, and permission to expand programs in some areas.
Calls for Accountability

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in March, Tomás Ojea Quintana, the special rapporteur for the situation of human rights in Myanmar, outlined a “pattern of gross and systematic violation of human rights which has been in place for many years.” He concluded that “UN institutions may consider the possibility to establish a commission of inquiry (CoI) with a specific fact finding mandate to address the question of international crimes.” At this writing more than 13 countries publically supported the formation of a CoI, including the United States, the United Kingdom and several other European countries, Australia, and Canada. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has not publically commented on Quintana’s call.

During a general debate at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva on September 17, Burmese ambassador U Wunna Maung Lwin denied the situation in Burma warranted an inquiry, saying there were “no crimes against humanity in Myanmar… (w)ith regard to the issue of impunity, any member of the military who breached national law was subject to legal punishments…there was no need to conduct investigations in Myanmar since there were no human rights violations there.”

Quintana’s report to the UN General Assembly in October elaborated on the possible parameters of a CoI, possible areas of investigation, and time frames. In late October US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said she wanted to “underscore the American commitment to seek accountability for the human rights violations that have occurred in Burma by working to establish an international Commission of Inquiry.” China has actively tried to block the proposal. The European Union, which drafted the annual Burma resolution, did not pursue calls for the CoI to be included in the resolution in the UN General Assembly.
Key International Actors

UN Secretary-General Ban expressed “disappointment” and “frustration” with the SPDC’s lack of cooperation in responding to the UN’s long-standing call for release of political prisoners; a free, fair, and inclusive election; and the start of a genuine process of national reconciliation. Despite requests to the SPDC, Ban’s special advisor on Burma, Vijay Nambiar, was not permitted to visit Burma in 2010.

Tomás Ojea Quintana visited Burma in February, but the SPDC denied him access for further visits after his report to the HRC.

China continued to be Burma’s most supportive international ally, routinely blocking criticism of Burma’s human rights record in multilateral forums. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao conducted a state visit to Burma on June 2, and Burmese President Than Shwe visited China from September 7-11. Than Shwe paid his second state visit to India in late July, where he signed numerous bilateral investment deals with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. India failed to voice criticism or concerns over Burma’s elections.

US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell visited Burma in May and met senior military leaders and Aung San Suu Kyi as part of the Obama administration’s “pragmatic engagement” policy with the SPDC. Campbell expressed his “profound disappointment” at the SPDC’s lack of reciprocity, and the US government was consistently critical of the election process. US Senator Jim Webb, who had been conducting private visits to Burma to talk with senior SPDC leaders, postponed a trip in June due to media allegations over Burma’s suspected nuclear program and cooperation with North Korea.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reduced its previous criticism of Burma in 2010. In a statement, Vietnam, the current chair of the association, stated that ASEAN emphasized the importance of “national reconciliation in Myanmar” and “holding general elections in a free and fair manner with the participation of all interested parties,” which it said contributed to the country’s stability and development. However, Indonesia and the Philippines criticized the lack of reform in Burma, particularly the elections which Philippines President Benigno Aquino III called a “farce.”

Burma’s neighbors China, India, and Thailand, continued to invest and trade extensively, especially in the extractive and hydro-electric energy industries. China is building two energy pipelines from western Burma to Yunnan, and a series of massive hydro-electric dams on the Irrawaddy River in upper Burma. Sales of natural gas to Thailand still account for the largest share of the SPDC’s foreign exchange earnings, which will increase markedly when the Chinese gas pipeline project is completed in 2013.

Russia and North Korea continued to sell arms to the SPDC, despite US concerns that North Korean sales could breach UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which imposes curbs on weapons proliferation.

http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011/burma


International Religious Freedom Report 2007
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
Highly repressive, authoritarian military regimes have ruled the country since 1962. Constitutional protection of religious freedom has not existed since 1988, after the armed forces brutally suppressed massive pro-democracy demonstrations and abrogated the Constitution. In 1990 pro-democracy parties won a majority of seats in a free and fair election, but the junta of senior military officers refused to recognize the results and has ruled the country by decree and without a legislature ever since. The authorities generally permitted most adherents of registered religious groups to worship as they choose; however, the Government imposed restrictions on certain religious activities and frequently abused the right to freedom of religion. There was no change in the limited respect for religious freedom by the Government during the period covered by this report. The Government continued to infiltrate and covertly and overtly monitor meetings and activities of virtually all organizations, including religious organizations. The Government systematically restricted efforts by Buddhist clergy to promote human rights and political freedom and discouraged and prohibited minority religious groups from constructing new places of worship. In some cases, government officials destroyed existing places of worship. The Government also actively promoted Theravada Buddhism over other religions, particularly among members of ethnic minorities. Christian and Islamic groups continued to have trouble obtaining permission to repair existing places of worship or build new ones. Anti-Muslim violence continued, as did the close monitoring of Muslim activities. Restrictions on worship of other non-Buddhist minority groups also continued throughout the country. Although there were no new reports of forced conversions of non-Buddhists, the Government applied pressure on students and poor youth to convert to Buddhism. Adherence or conversion to Buddhism is generally a prerequisite for promotion to senior government and military ranks.
During the period covered by this report, social tensions continued between the Buddhist majority and the Christian and Muslim minorities. Widespread prejudice existed against citizens of South Asian origin, many of whom are Muslims.
The U.S. Government advocated religious freedom with all facets of society, including with government officials, religious leaders, private citizens, scholars, diplomats of other governments, and international business and media representatives. Embassy representatives offered support to local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and religious leaders, and acted as a conduit for information exchanges with otherwise isolated human rights NGOs and religious leaders. Since 1999 the U.S. Secretary of State has designated the country as a “Country of Particular Concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act for particularly severe violations of religious freedom. The U.S. Government has a wide array of sanctions in place against the country for its violations of human rights.
Section I. Religious Demography
The country has an area of 261,970 square miles and a population of more than 54 million. The majority follow Theravada Buddhism, although in practice, popular Burmese Buddhism coexisted with astrology, numerology, fortune telling, and veneration of indigenous pre-Buddhist era deities called “nats.” Buddhist monks, including novices, number more than 400,000 and depend on the laity for their material needs, including clothing and daily donations of food. The country has a much smaller number of Buddhist nuns. The principal minority religious groups include Christian groups (Baptists, Roman Catholics, Anglicans, and an array of other Protestant denominations), Muslims (mostly Sunni), Hindus, and practitioners of traditional Chinese and indigenous religions. According to official statistics, almost 90 percent of the population practice Buddhism, 6 percent practice Christianity, and 4 percent practice Islam. These statistics almost certainly underestimate the non-Buddhist proportion of the population, which could be as high as 30 percent. Independent scholarly researchers place the Muslim population at 6 to 10 percent. A tiny Jewish community in Rangoon has a synagogue but no resident rabbi to conduct services for the approximately 25 Jewish believers.
The country is ethnically diverse, with some correlation between ethnicity and religion. Theravada Buddhism is the dominant religion among the majority Burman ethnic group and among the Shan, Arakanese, and Mon ethnic minorities of the eastern, western, and southern regions. Christianity is the dominant religion among the Kachin ethnic group of the northern region and the Chin and Naga ethnic groups of the western region, some of whom continue to practice traditional indigenous religions. Protestant groups report recent rapid growth among animist communities in Chin State. Christianity is also practiced widely among the Karen and Karenni ethnic groups of the southern and eastern regions, although many Karen and Karenni are Buddhist. In addition, some ethnic Indians are Christian. Hinduism is practiced chiefly by Burmese of Indian origin, who are concentrated in major cities and in the south central region. Islam is practiced widely in Rakhine State, where it is the dominant religion of the Rohingya minority, and in Rangoon, Ayeyarwady, Magway, and Mandalay Divisions. Some Burmans, Indians, and ethnic Bengalis also practice Islam. Chinese ethnic minorities generally practice traditional Chinese religions. Traditional indigenous beliefs are practiced widely among smaller ethnic groups in the highland regions. Practices drawn from those indigenous beliefs persist widely in popular Buddhist rituals, especially in rural areas.
Section II. Status of Religious Freedom
Legal/Policy Framework
Highly authoritarian military regimes have ruled the country since 1962. The current military government, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), has governed without a constitution or legislature since 1988. Most adherents of religious groups that register with the authorities generally are allowed to worship as they choose; however, the Government imposes restrictions on certain religious activities and frequently abuses the right to religious freedom.
Since independence in 1948, many of the ethnic minority areas have served as bases for armed resistance against the Government. Although the Government negotiated cease-fire agreements with most armed ethnic groups after 1989, active Shan, Karen, and Karenni insurgencies continued. Periodic fighting between the army and the leading Karen insurgent group, the Karen National Union (KNU), and multiple army attacks on Karen villages occurred. Successive civilian and military governments have tended to view religious freedom in the context of whether it threatens national unity or central authority.
The country has no official state religion. However, since independence, successive governments, civilian and military, have supported and associated themselves conspicuously with Buddhism. In 1961 the Government’s push to make Buddhism the state religion failed due to country-wide protests by religious minorities. However, in practice the Government continues to show a preference for Theravada Buddhism through its official propaganda and state-sponsored activities, including government donations to monasteries and support for Buddhist missionary activities. Promotions within the military and the civil service are generally contingent on the candidates being followers of Buddhism. The Ministry of Religious Affairs includes the powerful Department for the Promotion and Propagation of Sasana (Buddhist teaching).
State-controlled news media frequently depict or describe government officials paying homage to Buddhist monks, making donations at pagodas throughout the country, officiating at ceremonies to open, improve, restore, or maintain pagodas, and organizing ostensibly voluntary “people’s donations” of money, food, and uncompensated labor to build or refurbish Buddhist religious shrines throughout the country. State-owned newspapers routinely feature front-page banner slogans quoting from Buddhist scriptures. The Government has published books of Buddhist religious instruction.
Buddhist doctrine remains part of the state-mandated curriculum in all government-run elementary schools. Students can opt out of instruction in Buddhism and sometimes did. All students of government-run schools are required to recite a Buddhist prayer daily. Some Muslim students are allowed to leave the room during this recitation, while at some schools non-Buddhists are forced to recite the prayer.
The Department for the Perpetuation and Propagation of the Sasana handles the Government’s relations with Buddhist monks and Buddhist schools. The Government continues to fund two state Sangha universities in Rangoon and Mandalay to train Buddhist monks under the control of the state-sponsored State Monk Coordination Committee (“Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee” or SMNC). The Government-funded International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University (ITBMU) in Rangoon, which opened in 1998, has as its stated purpose “to share the country’s knowledge of Buddhism with the people of the world.” The main language of instruction is English. The Government also funds one university intended to teach non-citizens about Theravada Buddhism.
Since the 1960s Christian and Islamic groups have had difficulty importing religious literature into the country. All publications, religious and secular, remain subjected to control and censorship. It is illegal to import translations of the Bible in indigenous languages. Officials have occasionally allowed local printing or photocopying of limited copies of religious materials, including the Qur’an (with the notation that they were for internal use only) in indigenous languages without prior approval by government censors.
Virtually all organizations, religious or otherwise, must register with the Government. A government directive exempts “genuine” religious organizations from official registration; however, in practice only registered organizations can buy or sell property or open bank accounts. These requirements lead most religious organizations to seek registration. Religious organizations register with the Ministry of Home Affairs with the endorsement of the Ministry for Religious Affairs. Leaders of registered religious groups have more freedom to travel than leaders of unrecognized organizations and members of their congregations.
Religious affiliation is indicated on government-issued identification cards that citizens and permanent residents of the country are required to carry at all times. Citizens are also required to indicate their religion on official application forms, such as passports
Muslims across the country, as well as some other ethnic minority groups such as Chinese and Indians, are required to obtain advance permission from the township authorities whenever they wish to leave their hometowns.
Muslims in Rakhine State, on the western coast, and particularly those of the Rohingya minority group, continued to experience the severest forms of legal, economic, educational, and social discrimination. The Government denies citizenship status to Rohingyas because their ancestors allegedly did not reside in the country at the start of British colonial rule, as required by the country’s citizenship law. The Muslims assert that their presence in the area predates the British arrival by several centuries. On April 2, 2007, five U.N. Special Rapporteurs and an Independent Expert called on the Government to repeal or amend its 1982 Citizenship Law to insure compliance with international human rights obligations. Without citizenship status, Rohingyas do not have access to secondary education in state-run schools because the Government reserves secondary education for citizens only,
Since 1988 the Government permits only three marriages per year per village in the primarily Rohingya townships of Maungdaw and Buthidaung in northern Rakhine State, and requires the approval of the Regional Military Commander.
Muslims in the country also have difficulty obtaining birth certificates. A local official in Sittwe, Rakhine State, reportedly issued a verbal order in 2005 prohibiting the issuance of birth certificates to Muslim babies born in the area.
There are still original-resident Muslims living in Thandwe, but newcomers who are Muslim are not allowed to buy property or reside in the township. Muslims are not permitted to live in Gwa or Taungup.
Official public holidays include numerous Buddhist holy days, as well as a few Christian, Hindu, and Islamic holy days.
The Government made some nominal efforts to promote mutual understanding among practitioners of different religious groups.
In October 2006 Minister of Religious Affairs Brigadier General Thura Myint Maung, invited leaders from the four main religious groups (Buddhist, Muslim, Christian and Hindu) to a meeting in which the Minister denounced the 2006 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom. He told the religious leaders they knew there was freedom of religion in the country and claimed the Government always granted permits for religious gatherings and permitted renovations of mosques and churches. The Muslim leaders reportedly asked the Minister to unseal mosques in the central region that the Government closed following communal riots in earlier years and for permission to complete madrassahs that were under construction. The leaders reportedly were required to sign statements that they enjoyed religious freedom and were requested to write a letter stating that their religious communities were allowed to practice their faith freely in the country, which the ministry would display on its official website. During a discussion that followed, the representatives of the Islamic Religious Affairs Council (IRAC) stated that while there had been progress on some religious matters, there was room for further improvement. The Minister reportedly stopped further discussion and adjourned the meeting abruptly.
Restrictions on Religious Freedom
The Government continued to show preference for Theravada Buddhism while controlling the organization and restricting the activities and expression of the Buddhist clergy (Sangha), although some monks have resisted such control. Based on the 1990 Sangha Organization Law, the Government banned any organization of Buddhist monks other than the nine state-recognized monastic orders. These nine orders submit to the authority of the SMNC, the members of which are indirectly elected by monks. Violations of this ban are punishable by immediate public defrocking, and often by criminal penalties.
According to state-owned media reports, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a government-sponsored mass organization in which participation often is compulsory, organized courses in Buddhist culture attended by millions of persons. It was not possible to verify this claim independently.
There are reports that the ITBMU, while in principle open to the public, accepted only candidates who were approved by government authorities or recommended by a senior, progovernment Buddhist abbot.
The Government infiltrated or monitored the meetings and activities of virtually all organizations, including religious organizations. The meetings and activities of religious groups were also subject to broad government restrictions on freedom of expression and association. The Government subjected all media, including religious publications, and on occasion sermons, to control and censorship.
During the reporting period, the Government harassed a group of Buddhist worshippers who visited the Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon every Tuesday, the day of the week that Aung San Suu Kyi was born, to pray at the Tuesday pillar for her release and the release of all political prisoners in the country. Authorities sometimes used the pro-regime USDA to block the group from entering the pagoda grounds and make them pray outside the entrance or to shout and clap loudly to drown out their prayers. After Naw Ohn Hla, the spokesperson for the worshippers, protested to the pagoda authorities and wrote letters to regime leaders, local authorities again allowed the group access to the pagoda to pray; however, authorities ordered the pagoda janitors to throw buckets of water on the platform around the Tuesday pillar so that the worshippers would have to kneel in water. They also played music through loudspeakers at full volume to drown out the sound of the group’s prayers. Despite official harassment, including physical and verbal abuse by the pro-regime USDA and the People’s Militia, the worshippers continued to pray every Tuesday during the reporting period. In May 2007 many more groups began praying at different pagodas on Tuesdays for Aung San Suu Kyi’s release upon expiration of her detention order on May 27.
Authorities frequently refused to approve requests for gatherings to celebrate traditional Christian and Islamic holidays and restricted the number of Muslims that could gather in one place. For instance, in satellite towns surrounding Rangoon, Muslims are only allowed to gather for worship and religious training during the major Muslim holidays. In late 2006 a prominent Muslim religious organization planned to hold a golden jubilee in Mawlamyine, Mon State, to celebrate the founding of their organization. After they requested permission to hold the event, the local Division Commander, Brigadier General Thet Naing Win, called representatives of all non-Buddhist religious organizations in the area to a meeting. He informed them that permission would not be granted to hold any religious functions or ceremonies due to security reasons. The Muslim organization then altered its plans and held a low-profile ceremony to honor pilgrims who had been granted official permission by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to attend the Hajj.
On March 22, 2007, authorities detained Htin Kyaw, when he publicly protested the denial of his religious freedom to become a monk. Htin Kyaw had participated in earlier demonstrations against deteriorating economic and social conditions. Rangoon authorities then enforced a 1995 prohibition against any opposition political party member from being ordained as a monk or religious leader and forbade the abbot of a monastery in North Okkalapa in Rangoon to ordain Htin Kyaw.
On January 23, 2007, Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) released a report that documented the Government’s restrictions, discrimination, and persecution against Christians in the country for more than a decade. Subsequently, the Ministry of Religious Affairs pressured religious organizations in the country to publish statements in government-controlled media denying they had any connection with CSW or to condemn the report, and to reject the idea that religious discrimination existed in the country.
The Government continued to discriminate against members of minority religious groups, restricting their educational, proselytizing, and church-building activities.
Government authorities continued to prohibit Christian clergy from proselytizing in some areas. Christian groups reported that several times during the period covered by this report, local authorities denied applications for residency permits of known Christian ministers attempting to move into a new township. The groups indicated this was not a widespread practice, but depended on the individual community and local authority. In some instances, local authorities reportedly confiscated National Identity Cards of new converts to Christianity. Despite this, Christian groups reported that church membership grew, even in predominately Buddhist regions of the country.
During the reporting period, authorities in the Rangoon area closed several house churches because they did not have proper authorization to hold religious meetings. Other Rangoon home churches remained operational only after paying bribes to local officials. At the same time, the authorities made it difficult, although not impossible, to obtain approval for the construction of “authorized” churches.
On October 1, 2006, the Agape Zomi Baptist Church, with more than 1,000 members, had to stop its weekly services at Asia Plaza Hotel in Rangoon after the hotel management refused to continue renting them a conference room. The hotel management claimed the township authorities had ordered them to stop renting its facility to the group, which had worshipped at the hotel for approximately one year.
In August 2006 NaSaKa, the Government’s border security force, ordered eight Rohingya Muslim communities in Rathedaung Township, Rakhine State to close their religious centers, including 5 mosques, 4 madrassahs, 18 moqtobs (premadrassahs), and 3 hafez khanas (Qur’an reciting centers). Later, local authorities allowed two madrassahs to reopen. NaSaKa ordered the closures because it stated that the institutions were not officially registered. According to Muslim sources, government officials have not allowed any madrassahs to register officially. Muslim religious organizations are appealing the closures.
On August 19, 2006, government officials prohibited a Baptist church in Rangoon from conducting a literacy workshop for its youth. The authorities stated that the church must seek advance permission to hold such programs, although the church had held similar programs for the past four years without needing permission. Authorities also reportedly censored the same Baptist church’s weekly order of service.
In February 2006 Insein Township authorities also ordered a Chin evangelist to stop holding worship services in his house church in Aung San ward. In November 2005 authorities in Insein Township, Rangoon, pressured evangelical Christians of the 20-year-old Phawkkan Evangelical Church to sign “no worship” agreements. Some signed the agreements out of fear, but others refused. In February 2006 the authorities issued an order banning worship at the church.
The Religious Affairs Ministry has stipulated in the past that permission to construct new religious buildings “depends upon the population of the location;” however, there appeared to be no correlation between the construction of pagodas and the demand for additional places of Buddhist worship. In most regions of the country, Christian and Islamic groups that sought to build small places of worship on side streets or other inconspicuous locations were able to do so only with informal approval from local authorities; however, informal approval from local authorities created a tenuous legal situation. When local authorities or conditions have changed, informal approvals for construction have been rescinded abruptly and construction halted. In some cases, authorities demolished existing church buildings.
Christian groups continued to have trouble obtaining permission to buy land or build new churches in most regions. Sometimes the authorities refused because they claimed the churches did not possess proper property deeds, but access to official land titles was extremely difficult due to the country’s complex land laws and government title to most land. In some areas, permission to repair existing places of worship was easier to acquire. Muslims reported that the authorities banned them from constructing new mosques anywhere in the country, and they had great difficulty obtaining permission to repair or expand their existing structures. Historical mosques in Mawlamyine, Mon State, Sittwe, Rakhine State, and other areas of the country continued to deteriorate because authorities would not allow routine maintenance. Some authorities reportedly destroyed informal houses of worship or unauthorized religious construction they discovered. In early 2007, Muslims in Northern Rakhine State, repaired a mosque that had been severely damaged in a storm. When the authorities discovered this, they destroyed the repairs that had been made to the mosque. Buddhist groups have not experienced similar difficulties in obtaining permission to build new pagodas, monasteries, or community religious halls.
During the reporting period, the Catholic Church established new dioceses in Kachin and Shan states. The bishop of the new diocese in Pekon, Shan State, decided to build his residence on a plot of land long owned by the church. Brigadier General Myo Lwin, commander of Military Operation Command Seven at Pekon, ordered the partially built structure demolished, confiscated the land, and extended his own compound fence to enclose the church property. Despite appeals to higher authorities, the Church has not recovered its property.
The Myanmar Institute of Theology (MIT) in Insein Township, Rangoon is the premier seminary for Baptists throughout the country. To accommodate a rapidly increasing enrollment, MIT raised funds to build a new classroom building and purchase building supplies. At the last minute, government officials refused to grant a building permit. Four years later, piles of construction materials still litter the campus where they gather mildew and rust. In contrast, the Government openly supports Buddhist seminaries and permits them to build large campuses.
Some Christians in Chin State claimed that the authorities have not authorized the construction of any new churches since 1997. However, newly built churches are evident in several parts of the state. A Christian leader in Chin State stated that to obtain permission to repair or build a church he first had to obtain permission from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs (NaTaLa), the Immigration Department and the Township Peace and Development Committee. In Rangoon, Mandalay, and elsewhere, authorities allowed construction of new community centers by various Christian groups only if they agreed not to hold services there or erect Christian signs.
It remained extremely difficult for Muslims to get permission to repair existing mosques, although internal renovations were allowed in some cases. In some parts of Rakhine State, authorities cordoned off mosques and forbade Muslims to worship in them.
State censorship authorities continued to enforce special restrictions on local publication of the Bible, the Qur’an, and Christian and Islamic publications in general. The most onerous restriction was a list of more than 100 prohibited words that the censors would not allow in Christian or Islamic literature because they are “indigenous terms” or derived from the Pali language long used in Buddhist literature. Many of these words have been used and accepted by some of the country’s Christian and Islamic groups since the colonial period. Organizations that translate and publish non-Buddhist religious texts were appealing these restrictions. In addition, censors have sometimes objected to passages of the Old Testament and the Qur’an that they believe approve the use of violence against nonbelievers. There have been no reports of arrests or prosecutions for possession of any traditional religious literature in recent years.
Authorities also restricted the quantity of bibles and Qur’ans brought into the country. During the reporting period, however, individuals continued to carry Bibles and Qur’ans into the country in small quantities for personal use. There were no reports that authorities intercepted or confiscated Qur’ans at border entry points, but religious leaders complained that postal workers steal them to sell on the black market.
In general, the Government has not allowed permanent foreign religious missions to operate in the country since the mid-1960s, when it expelled nearly all foreign missionaries and nationalized all private schools and hospitals, which were extensive and affiliated mostly with Christian religious organizations. The Government is not known to have paid any compensation in connection with these extensive confiscations. Christian groups, including Catholics and Protestants, have brought in foreign clergy and religious workers for visits as tourists, but they have been careful to ensure that the Government did not perceive their activities as proselytizing. Some Christian theological seminaries also continued to operate, as did several Bible schools and madrassahs. The Government has allowed some members of foreign religious groups, such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), to enter the country to provide humanitarian assistance or English language training to government officials. Some of these groups did not register with the Myanmar Council of Churches, but were able to conduct religious services without government interference.
The Government allowed members of all religious groups to establish and maintain links with coreligionists in other countries and to travel abroad for religious purposes, subject to the country’s restrictive passport and visa issuance practices, foreign exchange controls, and government monitoring, which extended to all international activities by all citizens regardless of religion. The Government sometimes expedited its burdensome passport issuance procedures for Muslims making the Hajj or Buddhists going on pilgrimage to Bodhgaya, India, although it limited the number of pilgrims. In 2006 government officials allowed approximately 3,000 Muslims to participate in the Hajj. The procedure reportedly became more cumbersome in 2006 due to the relocation of most government offices from Rangoon to Nay Pyi Taw. Observers speculate that had this not been the case, more Muslims would have gone. During the period covered by this report, immigration and passport officials continued to use the occasion of the Hajj to extort bribes from would-be travelers. Government and private travel agencies processed approximately 2,500 Buddhist pilgrims to travel to Bodhgaya in India.
Non-Buddhists continued to experience employment discrimination at upper levels of the public sector. Few have ever been promoted to the level of Director General or higher. There were no non-Buddhists who held flag rank in the armed forces, although a few Christians reportedly achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The Central Executive Committee of the largest opposition group–the National League for Democracy–also included no non-Buddhists, although individual members from most religious groups in the country supported the party. The Government discouraged Muslims from enlisting in the military, and Christian or Muslim military officers who aspired for promotion beyond the rank of major were encouraged by their superiors to convert to Buddhism. Some Muslims who wished to join the military reportedly had to list “Buddhist” as their religion on their application, though they were not required to convert.
Rohingya Muslims, although essentially treated as illegal foreigners, were not issued Foreigner Registration Cards. Instead, the Government gave some of them “Temporary Registration Cards” (TRC). UNHCR estimated that only 650,000 of the approximately 800,000 Rohingyas possessed TRCs. Authorities have insisted that Muslim men applying for TRCs submit photos without beards. The authorities did not allow government employees of the Islamic faith, including village headmen, to grow beards, and dismissed some who already had beards. The authorities also did not consider many non-Rohingya Muslims to be citizens. In order for these Muslims to receive National Registration Cards and passports, they must pay large bribes. Ethnic Burman Muslims pay less than Muslims from ethnic minority groups (primary those of Indian or Bengali descent).
In 2006 a prominent Muslim religious organization asked the Rakhine State Peace and Development Council Chairman, the Regional Military Commander, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs to lift marriage restrictions for Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State. At the end of the reporting period, they had yet to receive a response.
In Rangoon, Muslims can usually obtain birth certificates for newborns, but local authorities refused to allow them to place the names of the babies on their household registers.
Authorities generally did not grant permission to Rohingya or Muslim Arakanese to travel from their hometowns for any purpose; however, permission was sometimes obtainable through bribery. Non-Arakanese Muslims were given more freedom to travel; however, they were also required to seek permission, which was usually granted after a bribe is paid. Muslims residing in Rangoon could visit beach resort areas in Thandwe, Rakhine State, but could not return to Rangoon without the signature of the Regional Military Commander. Those with money were able to bribe local officials to return. Muslims residing outside of Rakhine State often were barred from return travel to their homes if they visit other parts of Rakhine State.
Rohingyas did not have access to state-run schools beyond primary education and were unable to obtain employment in any civil service positions. Muslim students from Rakhine State who completed high school were not granted permits to travel outside the state to attend college or university. In lieu of a diploma, Rohingya high school graduates received a sheet of paper that stated they would receive a diploma upon presentation of a citizenship card; however, Rohingyas can never obtain such a card.
Many of the approximately 25,000 Rohingya Muslims remaining in refugee camps in Bangladesh refused to return because they feared human rights abuses, including religious persecution.
Abuses of Religious Freedom
Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), has been in prison or house arrest since 2003, when forces allied with the Government attacked her and her convoy, which included several NLD-allied monks, while traveling in Sagaing Division in the northwestern region of the country. The Government reportedly used criminals dressed in monks’ robes in the ambush. On May 15, authorities detained more than 30 worshippers in Rangoon when they approached separate pagodas to pray for Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners. At the end of the reporting period, the worshippers were still detained. The next day USDA members, claiming to represent “the people,” detained another 15 worshippers after they prayed at a pagoda in Mingladon Township, but the authorities let them go the same day. On May 25, 2007, the Government extended Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest for an additional year.
In February 2007 the Burmese Army arrested a monk who was allegedly trading Buddha images to Buddhists in Bangladesh illegally. The army forced the monk to disrobe in contravention to Buddhist precepts that require a monk to have his robes removed at a ceremony in a monastery. Laypersons, regardless of status, may not demote a monk to become a layperson.
On July 2, 2006, authorities from Thandwe, Rakhine State arrested Abbot Wila Tha and his assistant Than Kakesa from the Buddhist monastery of U Shwe Maw village, Taungup Township, closed the monastery, and forced 59 monks and novices to leave. Local sources claimed that the reason for the arrest was that the abbot refused to accept donations from or conduct religious ceremonies for the authorities. The authorities also claimed the abbot was endangering local stability by talking to the monks and novices about democracy, that he was a supporter of the NLD (National League for Democracy), and that he had supported the visit of Aung San Suu Kyi (pro-democracy activist and leader of the NLD) when she visited the area several years earlier. The exile-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) estimated there were 86 Buddhist monks in prison for various charges. It was not possible to verify the AAPP estimate. The number of non-Buddhists in prison for their religious beliefs was unknown. Authorities usually defrocked monks when they arrested them and treated them like ordinary prisoners, including using torture. The prison authorities disrespectfully addressed the monks by their given names, not their religious titles.
Local civilian and military authorities continued to take actions against Christian groups: arresting clergy, closing home churches, and prohibiting religious services.
In February 2006, police at Hpa-an, Karen State, arrested Yeh Zaw, a member of the Phawkkan Evangelical Church. Yeh Zaw had earlier written a letter to the regime leader urging him to end the persecution of his church that Rangoon authorities closed earlier in 2006, banning members from worshipping there. Police charged him with traveling without an identity card.
In 2005 local authorities in the Chin State capital of Hakha notified Baptist leaders that they would be forced to relocate an active, historic cemetery from church property to a remote location outside of town. Religious leaders reported that authorities continued to forcefully relocate cemeteries in many parts of the country.
In the past, pagodas or government buildings often have been built on confiscated Muslim land.
In Kachin State, authorities have constructed Buddhist shrines in Christian communities where few or no Buddhists reside and have tried to coerce Christians into forced labor to carry bricks and other supplies for the shrine’s construction. In September 2006 government officials inaugurated a pagoda near the Kachin Independence Organization’s headquarters at Laiza, Kachin State. Kachin sources reported there were no Buddhists living in the community. In northern Rakhine State, authorities frequently forced Rohingyas to help construct Buddhist shrines, even though Buddhists there account for approximately 2 percent of the population.
In January 2006 Muslim Rohingyas from at least ten surrounding villages claimed the military forced them to carry building supplies for three model villages at Padauk Myin, Mala Myin and Thaza Myin in Rathedaung Township. Certain townships in the Rakhine State, such as Thandwe, Gwa, and Taungup, were declared “Muslim-free zones” by government decree in 1983.
Authorities have attempted to prevent Chin Christians from practicing their religion. In 2005 the military commander in Matupi Township, Chin State, ordered the destruction of a 30-foot cross erected on a hillside with government permission in 1999. A more senior military official subsequently told local church authorities that they could get permission to reconstruct the cross; however, the local pastors have thus far refused to ask for such authorization. In the past, these crosses often have been replaced with pagodas, sometimes built with forced labor.
SPDC authorities continued to “dilute” ethnic minority populations by encouraging, or even forcing, Buddhist Burmans to relocate to ethnic areas. In predominantly Muslim northern Rakhine State, authorities established “model villages” to relocate released ethnic Burman criminals from other parts of the country.
There continued to be credible reports from diverse regions of the country that government officials compelled persons, Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike, especially in rural areas, to contribute money, food, or materials to state-sponsored projects to build, renovate, or maintain Buddhist religious shrines or monuments. The Government denied that it used coercion and called these contributions “voluntary donations” consistent with Buddhist ideas of making merit. In April 2006 authorities in Lashio reportedly tried to coerce merchants to contribute large sums to construct a Buddhist shrine. Christian merchants refused to participate and the funds raised were well below the authorities’ target.
Forced Religious Conversion
Muslim and Christian community leaders reported that during the period covered by this report, authorities had moved away from a campaign of forced conversion to Buddhism and instead focused on enticing non-Buddhists to convert to Buddhism by offering charity or bribery. Conversion of non-Buddhists, coerced or otherwise, is part of a longstanding government campaign to “Burmanize” ethnic minority regions. This campaign has coincided with increased military presence and pressure. In 2005 there was a single, unverified report of forced conversion at gunpoint in Chin State; however, Christian groups reported that such violent cases were less frequent than in earlier years. In September 2006 Chin sources reported that 15 students withdrew from a government-operated hostel for girls in Matupi, Chin State, after formerly voluntary Buddhist evening prayers became compulsory for all the hostel residents. Although the girls received free school fees, food, and accommodation, they complained they felt pressured to become Buddhist. In Kanpetlet, Chin State, NaTaLa operated a school exclusively for Buddhist students and guaranteed them government jobs after graduation. Christian children had to agree to convert to Buddhism if they wanted to attend this school.
There were no reports of forced religious conversion of minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from the United States, or of the refusal to allow such citizens to return to the United States.
Section III. Societal Abuses and Discrimination
Preferential treatment for Buddhists and widespread prejudice against ethnic Indians, particularly ethnic Rohingya Muslims, were key sources of social tensions between the Buddhist majority and Christian and Muslim minorities.
In February 2006, violent clashes broke out between Muslims and Buddhists in Magway Division in response to rumors that Muslim men had raped a Burman woman. Ethnic Burmans attacked and torched Muslim and ethnic Indian homes, shops, and mosques. Rioting and looting spread to surrounding towns, including Chauk and Salin. Local security forces did not intervene at first, but as violence spread authorities imposed a strict curfew in several towns. Reliable sources stated that the authorities arrested 17 people in Sinbyukyun and another 55 persons in Chauk, mostly Muslims. Unofficial sources claimed that 3 people died and another 10 were injured in the riots. Three mosques in Yenangyaung, Chauk, and Saku were reportedly destroyed in the violence. At the end of the reporting period, the mosques remained sealed and authorities would not permit Muslims to rebuild them, nor did authorities conduct inquiries into the attacks. Christians reported that an entire Muslim village fled to the monastery of a trusted Buddhist abbot near Shwe Settaw to seek refuge during the riots.
These attacks follow earlier communal violence in Kyauk Pyu, Rakhine State, in 2005. During several days of violence, two Muslims were killed and one Buddhist monk was severely injured. Some Islamic groups blamed the Government for trying to increase tensions between Buddhists and Muslims as part of a “divide and rule” strategy.
Since 1994, when Buddhist members split away from the KNU (Karen National Union) to organize the pro-government Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), there have been armed conflicts between the DKBA and the predominately Christian antigovernment KNU. Although the DKBA reportedly includes some Christians and there are some Buddhists in the KNU, the armed conflict between the two Karen groups has had strong religious overtones. There were also unverified reports that DKBA authorities continued to expel villagers who converted to Christianity.
During the reporting period, a Burmese language document surfaced titled, “Program to Eliminate Christianity.” The document suggested 17 points for countering Christianity in the country; however, the source of the document was unknown and several grammatical errors raised questions about its authenticity. There was no definite evidence to link the document to the Government.
Section IV. U.S. Government Policy
Government restrictions on speech, press, assembly, and movement, including diplomatic travel, made it difficult to obtain timely and accurate information on human rights in the country, including on freedom of religion. Information about abuses often becomes available only months or years after the events and frequently is difficult or impossible to verify.
The U.S. Government continued to promote religious freedom in its contacts with all sectors of society, as part of its overall policy to promote human rights. During the period covered by this report, Embassy officials discussed the importance of improved religious freedom with government and military officials, private citizens, scholars, representatives of other governments, and international business and media representatives. Embassy representatives met regularly with leaders of Buddhist, Christian, and Islamic religious groups, including ethnic minority religious leaders, members of the faculties of schools of theology, and other religious-affiliated organizations and NGOs. This included regular invitations to the American Charg� d’Affaires’ residence to build understanding and tolerance among the groups.
Through outreach and traveling, when not blocked by regime officials, Embassy representatives offered support to local NGOs and religious leaders and exchanged information with many otherwise isolated human rights NGOs and religious leaders. Representatives of the Rohingya minority participated in English language and current events studies at the Embassy’s American Center. The American Center regularly translated statements and reports by the U.S. Government and various NGOs on violations of religious freedom in the country and distributed them via its frequently visited library. The U.S funded an effort for UNHCR to initiate work with the Ministry of Immigration and Population to issue TRCs, fairly and without bribes or unreasonable requirements, to undocumented Rohingyas. In addition, the Embassy worked closely with Buddhist, Islamic, and Christian NGOs involved in education and teacher training.
Since 1999 the Secretary of State has designated the country as a “Country of Particular Concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act for particularly severe violations of religious freedom. Because of the country’s poor human rights situation, including its abuses of religious freedom, the United States imposed extensive sanctions on the regime. The United States has also opposed all assistance to the Government by international financial institutions and urged the Governments of other countries to take similar actions. U.S. sanctions include a ban on imports from the country, a ban on the export of financial services to the country, a ban on bilateral aid to the Government, a ban on the export of arms to the country, and a suspension of General System of Preferences (GSP) benefits and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) financial services in support of U.S. investment and exports to the country. The U.S. Government also ended active promotion of trade with the country, limited the issuance of visas to high-ranking government and military officials and their immediate family members, and froze SPDC assets in the United States. New investment in the country by U.S. citizens has been prohibited since May 1997.

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90131.htm


Giri Cyclone Relief Committee of Thailand http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=40139619&access_key=key-2o0eghc5x7fc4ryk494e&page=1&viewMode=list


Full_report of From OCHA http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=40144387&access_key=key-eg1kw3h8flddwww1b2w&page=1&viewMode=list


Full Report 2 http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=40201057&access_key=key-2bsl79jf1erlymsakxli&page=1&viewMode=list